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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a reconstruction of a Marxian political economy in terms of excess. First, we
show the originality of Marx’s view of excess as establishing market exchange and contrast this view with
Smith’s. We also discuss how the market is organised by merchants and is outside the economy, taken in its
substantive meaning. Secondly, the reason why the existence of the market does not immediately lead to the
rise of capitalism is explained using the concept of a barrier. Thirdly, we show that capitalism might not have
arisen if the barrier had been removed; this is from the standpoint of Althusser’s aleatory materialism. The
important conclusion that “outside” is “betweenness-encounter” as void is drawn from our inquiry into
aleatory materialism. Finally, we refer to the problem of excess in capitalism.
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1. The Origin of Market Exchange
In the first book of Capital, Karl Marx writes as follows:
The exchange of commodities begins where communities (Gemeinwesen) end, at their
points of contact with other communities, or with members of the latter. So soon, how-
ever, as products once become commodities in the external relations of a community,
they also, by reaction, become commodities in its internal intercourse. (Marx [1867]
1996, p. 98. Trans. mod.)
This famous passage “the exchange of commodities begins where communities (Gemeinwesen)
end” refers to the historical origin of market exchange. At the same time, it underlies Marx’s
vision of the capitalist market.1 His vision forms a striking contrast to Adam Smith’s description of
the origin of market exchange in The Wealth of Nations:
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* This paper is an introduction to my forthcoming book (Oki 2012).
1 Uno Ko–zo– refines Marx’s historical sketch into his own method of economics. Uno theorises the market, or what he
calls ryu–tu– (circulation), as a form essentially external to a social substance, or what he calls seisan (production), and refor-
mulates the first two parts of Capital, vol. 1, into the theory of circulation as a form. My studies owe much to Uno’s
methodology. See Uno ([1964] 1980), especially introduction and part I.
When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a very small
part of a man’s wants which the produce of his own labour can supply. He supplies the
far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour,
which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other
men’s labour as he has occasion for. Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in
some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a
commercial society. (Smith [1776]1976, p. 37)
According to Smith, market exchange goes hand in hand with the social division of labour. This
means that market exchange is a necessary condition for the social division of labour within a
community, and the mutual dependency of a community becomes possible only through market
exchange. In other words, there is no exchange between independent communities.
Marx has quite a different view from Smith, who understands that market exchange and the
social division of labour are two sides of the same coin. He illustrates the fact that “commodity
production is not a necessary condition for the social division of labour” by citing the example of
the primitive Indian community. “Labour is socially divided in the primitive Indian community,”
says Capital, “although the products do not thereby become commodities” (Marx [1867] 1996, p.
98), which are exchanged in the market. In Marx’s opinion, only independent individuals, who do
not exist inside the spontaneous community, such as the primitive Indian community or a patriar-
chal family, enter into the exchange relation of commodities with each other.
This difference of positions is reflected in their respective views on wealth. It is well-known
that what Smith calls the wealth of nations is the produce of labour, which is fundamentally
composed of necessities (“necessaries”) or the means of subsistence.2 According to him, people
have to get the means of their subsistence through market exchange when the social division of
labour has been established. From his perspective, market exchange has been carried out from time
immemorial if the history of the division of labour is just as old. In fact, Smith refers to the
“propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” as a human instinct or “the necessary consequence of
the faculties of reason and speech” (Smith [1776]1976, p. 25). In this sense, it can be said that
Smith helped later generations in naturalizing the market.3 In other words, Smith is obsessed with
the dichotomy between autarky without a market and the social division of labour with a market.4
By contrast, Marx, who points out that the social division of labour within a community, such
as the primitive Indian community, was not accompanied by the market, does not link wealth to
necessities but rather to an excess of products over what is needed:
The first spontaneously evolved form of wealth consists of overplus or excess of prod-
ucts, i.e. of the portion of products which are not directly required as use-values, or else
of the possession of products whose use-value lies outside the range of mere necessity.
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2 Smith’s definition of wealth is deeply connected with his criticism of Mercantilists. Although Mercantilism is often
interpreted as the notion that wealth is money, and Smith himself said so, it should be characterized by its emphasis on lux-
ury, an idea that originated with Bernard de Mandeville. Smith carefully excepts luxury from the produce of labour as
wealth.  To underline luxury was so common in the 17th and 18th centuries that David Hume, with whom Smith largely
agrees, except on this point, wrote an article titled “Of Luxury,” which was later changed to “Of Refinement in the Arts.” I
have traced the history of thoughts on luxury (Oki 2012, chap. 1).
3 Karl Polanyi criticises Adam Smith’s hypothesis about “primitive man’s alleged predilection for gainful occupa-
tions” (Polanyi [1944] 2001, p. 46) which later yielded to the concept in modern economics of the “Economic Man.”
4 This means that Smith, at least in The Wealth of Nations, overlooks what Polanyi calls reciprocity and redistribu-
tion. Although it is said that a more profound theory of history, or a four stages theory of history similar to Marxist histori-
cal materialism, can be found in Lectures on Jurisprudence, this theory is weakened in The Wealth of Nations. See Meek
(1976).
When considering the transition from commodity to money, we saw that at a primitive
stage of production it is this overplus or excess of products which really forms the sphere
of commodity exchange. Superfluous products become exchangeable products or com-
modities. (Marx [1859] 1970, pp. 126-127)
In the Critique, Marx describes that wealth is originally made up from “overplus or excess of
products,” not from necessity. It is not wealth in general but “bourgeois wealth” (Marx [1859]
1970, p. 27. Trans. mod.), or the market form of wealth, which he refers to here.5 Excess of prod-
ucts is, therefore, nothing but what “really forms the sphere of commodity exchange.” It is certain
that the excess of products is not exchanged for the purpose of consumption. Thus market
participants in their original form are merchants who exchange merchandise for commercial
purposes, not simple commodity producers/consumers.6
In established capitalism, of course, wage-labourers buy commodities for their consumption
via the market, so that it is not only excess but also necessity which is exchanged as a commodity.
As Immanuel Wallerstein points out, capitalism is marked by “the commodification of
everything,” or the “widespread commodification of processes––not merely exchange processes,
but production processes, distribution processes, and investment processes––that had previously
been conducted other than via a ‘market’” (Wallerstein 1995, p. 15).  Nevertheless, it should be
noted that the origin of market exchange did not lie in the domain of necessity but in that of
excess, and the range of commodification expanded from the former to the latter.7
In order to demonstrate the importance of this point, let us examine John Hicks’s concept of
the “mercantile economy” (Hicks 1969, p. 33). Hicks contrasted the non-market economy, namely
the customary economy and the command economy, with the mercantile economy. This conceptu-
al distinction has both a strength and a weakness. At first, we shall deal with his strong point. He
dares to use the term mercantile, not the more familiar term market, as a counterpart to the term
non-market. This usage means that he focuses on the central role of the specialized trader or the
merchant in the market.
I would emphasize that it is specialization upon trade which is the beginning of the new
world [or the mercantile economy]; not the preliminary stages of trading without special-
ization. Casual trading––isolated acts of exchange, involving no commitment by either
party that there will be further exchanges––such must have occurred, now and then, from
the earliest times, but the effects on the lives of those making them will have been
minimal. (Hicks 1969, p. 25)
These passages can be seen to be a further elaboration of Marx’s view that the market originated in
excess. His understanding, though, also has a weak point.8 Hicks is wrong in using the term econo-
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5 The opening words in the Critique, “the bourgeois wealth … presents itself as an immense accumulation of com-
modities,” are rewritten in Capital as follows. “The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production
prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of commodities”, its unit being a single commodity” (Marx [1867]
1996, p. 45). 
6 Smith surely writes that everybody becomes “a merchant” and that the society changes into a “commercial society,”
when the division of labour has been established. He does not, however, use these terms in their basic meanings. It must be
noted that he distinguishes a commercial society from what he calls “civilized society,” namely capitalist society.
7 Although Smith recognises that Europe has actually progressed in this direction, he concludes that it is “contrary to
the natural course of things” (Smith [1776] 1976, p. 422), from subsistence to convenience to luxury.
8 Hicks unintentionally criticises Smith’s division of labour from the same perspective as Marx. “We have been so
accustomed, ever since Adam Smith, to the association of division of labour with market development, that it comes with
something of a shock when one realizes that this was not its origin. The first development of skill is independent of the
my in “the formal meaning” (Polanyi 1977, p. 20). According to Polanyi, the formal meaning of
“economic” stems from “the means-ends relationship,” or the norm of a maximum result at mini-
mum expense, which is closely related to the market’s reading of “economic.”9 By contrast, the
substantive meaning refers to “the process of satisfying material wants.” Satisfied via the market in
capitalism, most material wants have nothing to do with the market in the greater part of human
history, or in non-capitalist societies.10
Hicks understands that a mercantile economy gradually developed from a First Phase (city-
states such as ancient Greece), via a Middle Phase to a Modern Phase, namely, capitalism. But
what is described by the term mercantile, that is, the market, had never subsumed the economy in
the substantive meaning before capitalism arose. The mercantile economy is therefore a false
concept outside capitalism.
The non/pre-capitalist economy is nothing but the non-market economy, namely an economy
whose maintenance and reproduction are not fundamentally supported by the market. The pre-
capitalist market, organized by merchants, is outside the economy in this substantive meaning.
Capitalism, the sole economy that is enveloped by the market, is maintained and reproduced
through the market. Furthermore, it is important to note that capitalism, namely, the economy that
is, even if partly, subsumed by the market, is not generated in consequence of an internal
development of either the economy (Smith) or the market (Hicks).11 This can be illustrated from
history: the increase in productivity of Sung China did not bring forth capitalism, and medieval
Italian cities, which prospered from the Mediterranean Sea Trade, did not transform into
capitalism.12
2. A Barrier to Commodification
The market is what is originally organized by merchants or “merchants’ capital” as one of the
“antediluvian forms” (Marx [1867] 1996, p. 174) of capital. Thus the economy, or the process of
social (re)production, is properly alien to the market. But why did the market remain estranged
from the economy until the rise of capitalism? Why can’t we think that commerce between
communities immediately invaded the community? In fact, Marx says: 
Of course, commerce will more or less retroact on the communities between which it is
carried on. It will subordinate production more and more to exchange-value by making
luxuries and subsistence more dependent on sale than on the immediate use of the prod-
ucts. Thereby it dissolves the old relationships. It multiplies money circulation. It
encompasses no longer merely the surplus of production, but bites deeper and deeper
into the latter, and makes entire branches of production dependent upon it. Nevertheless
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market. It does imply specialization, but it is a specialization (like that which occurs when a new process is introduced into
a modern factory) that is directed from the top” (Hicks 1969, p. 23).
9 As a matter of fact, what Marx’s Gemeinwesen indicates is almost the same as the substantive meaning of “econom-
ic.” Although both the terms Gemeinde and Gemeinwesen in German are often translated into the term community in
English, they have different meanings for Marx. The former implies political organization, whereas the latter refers to rela-
tions of reproduction mainly based on tribes, or what Polanyi calls an economy embedded in society.
10 It is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to deal with the so-called formalist-substantivist debate caused by
Polanyi’s proposition.
11 This conflict between Smith and Hicks has the same structure as the famous debate in the Marxist camp, the transi-
tion debate. On this debate, see Sweezy et al. (1954). This debate will be taken up later.
12 For the fact that the high productivity of Sung China did not result in the “miracle,” see Jones (1988, p. chap. 4).
this disintegrating effect depends very much on the nature of the producing community.
(Marx [1894] 1998, p. 328, Trans. mod.)
This passage quoted from Capital, vol. 3, includes two features. Firstly, when the market
penetrates the process of production within a community, the old relationships of the community
are disintegrated. In non/pre-capitalism, therefore, the economy basically conflicts with the
market, for the latter has the effect of disintegrating the former. Secondly, this disintegrating effect
is a “retroaction” of commerce between communities.13 It must, however, be noted that this
retroaction of commercialization or commodification does not occur easily, for the community
deters the market both from dissolving relationships within it and from commodifying not only
surplus or luxury but also subsistence. In fact, Marx emphasizes that one compelling force, namely
the primitive accumulation of capital, is a necessary condition for the rise of capitalism.
Regrettably, Marx does not investigate the problem of the deterrent or the barrier to the market in
depth, so I shall refer to other studies in order to explore this point further.
Robert Brenner, who was a key figure in the so-called “Brenner debate,” has recently shown
how feudalism in European countries, except England and the northern Netherlands, did not
generate capitalism.
Brenner insists that different social-property relations, which in his terminology mean what
Marx calls “relations of production,” have different rules for reproduction. Rules for reproduction
in feudalism are entirely different from those in capitalism, which are to maximize profits by
seeking gains from trade. Rules for peasants are to produce for subsistence, and those for feudal
lords are to use levies from peasants in order to build stronger political groups. Peasants and lords
in feudalism would not adopt capitalist rules for reproduction to maximize profits, even though
possible, for to do so was likely to threaten their subsistence or status.14 The transition from
feudalism to capitalism in England and the northern Netherlands is not the consequence of
intentionally adopting capitalist rules for reproduction, but the unintended consequence of seeking
to maintain feudal social-property relations:
[I]nsofar as breakthroughs to modern economic growth occurred, these must be under-
stood to have taken place as the unintended consequences of actions either by individual
lords or peasants or communities of lords or peasants seeking to reproduce themselves as
feudal-type actors in feudal-type ways. In other words, the emergence of capitalist social-
property relations resulted from attempts by feudal individual actors to carry out feudal
rules for reproduction and/or by feudal collectivities to maintain feudal social-property
relations, under conditions where seeking to do so had the unintended effect of actually
undermining those social-property relations. Only where such transformations occurred
did economic development ensue, for only where capitalist social-property relations
emerged did economic actors find it made sense to adopt the new rules for reproduction
imposed by the new system of social-property relations. (Brenner 2007, p. 89)
Ironically, France and north-east Europe, which succeeded in rebuilding feudalism, stagnated, and
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13 Marx expresses almost the same opinion in the citation at the opening of this paper. “So soon, however, as prod-
ucts once become commodities in the external relations of a community, they also, by reaction (auf rückschlagend),
become commodities in its internal intercourse” (Marx [1867] 1996, p. 98).
14 Brenner finds an answer to the subtitle of his paper: “Where Adam Smith Went Wrong.” “Where Adam Smith thus
fell short––to put it most generally––was in presenting his basic mechanisms as if they held universally, or, more precisely,
in failing to specify the socio-economic conditions under which his mechanisms making for economic growth did and did
not hold” (Brenner 2007, p. 57).
England and the northern Netherlands, which failed to maintain the old relationships, achieved
remarkable development as an unintended consequence. 
As long as a community continues to adopt feudal rules for reproduction, it restrains the
effects of commodification. Peasants choose to produce for subsistence rather than for exchange,
to diversify to produce everything needed rather than to specialize in order to increase
productivity, in short, “safety first.” Even if what Marx calls a retroaction of commodification
exists, it is not until the old rules for reproduction cannot be adopted that it comes into force.15
This applies to a more recent case. In my view, what James Scott finds in the peasantry in
1930’s Southeast Asia are the same rules for reproduction as were adopted in feudalism. He calls
these rules the moral economy, the subsistence ethic, or the “safety first” principle.16 The “safety
first” principle means peasants prefer “to minimize the probability of having a disaster rather than
maximizing his average return” and “subsistence crops over nonedible cash crops” (Scott 1976, p.
18). This is exactly similar to feudal modes of behaviour as depicted by Brenner: “Given the
uncertainty of the harvest and the unacceptable cost of ‘business failure’––namely the possibility
of starvation––peasants could not afford to adopt maximizing exchange value via specialization as
their rule for reproduction and adopted instead the rule of ‘safety first’ or ‘produce for
subsistence’” (Brenner 2007, p. 68).
Scott’s argument, however, is different from Brenner’s concerning switching modes of
action. According to Brenner, peasants who possess sufficient means of subsistence or land would
not positively gain from trade even if they were given the opportunity to do so. In his opinion, the
conversion from feudal rules for reproduction to capitalist rules should be understood “as a second
choice, made under duress, as the only way to survive in the face of insufficient land to cultivate
food gains” (Brenner 2007, p. 79). By contrast, Scott understands that the safety-first principle is
applied only at the subsistence level, and peasants will choose to maximize profits if they are
better off:
The safety-first principle thus does not imply that peasants are creatures of custom who
never take risk they can avoid. When innovations such as dry season crops, new seeds,
planting techniques, or production for market offer clear and substantial gains at little or
no risk to subsistence security, one is likely to find peasants plunging ahead. What
safety-first does imply, however, is that there is a defensive perimeter around subsistence
routines within which risks are avoided as potentially catastrophic and outside of which
a more bourgeois calculus of profit prevails. (Scott 1976, p. 24)
What is apparent in this passage is that Scott considers the switch from safety-first principle to a
bourgeois calculus of profit as continuous, not discontinuous. It is possible to say that the differ-
ence between Brenner and Scott lies in the objects of their investigations. The former deals with
the non-market economy before capitalism, the latter examines the non-market economy as part of
world capitalism. In the non-market economy before capitalism, peasants and lords strongly
resisted commodifying forces which threatened their reproduction. By contrast, the non-market
economy had but a weakened barrier to commodification when world capitalism emerged. If we
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15 Not hesitating to accept Fernand Braudel’s distinction between capitalism and the market economy, we should pay
attention to avoid the following error. One often condemns capitalism as unstable or unfair, whereas he finds the market
economy innocent. The ideal market economy for him is nothing less than what Smith calls the early and rude state of soci-
ety, or market without capital. However, from the viewpoint of Marx, who understands that market originated in excess,
there is no market without capital.
16 The term moral economy, used as part of the title of his book, is, of course, borrowed from Edward P. Thompson
(1971). 
overlook the rise of world capitalism as a watershed in history, we are misled into Smithian
prejudices that make the propensity to exchange natural.17
The transition from feudalism to capitalism resulted from the fact that the relationships that
had enabled peasants and lords to reproduce themselves were lost. The retroaction of
commodification is not the sole cause of the dismantling of the feudal relationships, because it did
not necessarily generate capitalism in the greater part of human history, in spite of its universality.
Commodification, however, worked more easily than before, once capitalism had been established.
This does not, of course, mean that in capitalism everything is commodified and there is no room
for the non-market economy. Nevertheless, we should notice that the dividing wall between the
market and what is outside it becomes very much lower in capitalism.18
3. An Aleatory Encounter
Although the market in which excess was exchanged by merchants’ capital has existed from very
early times, it had been impossible, until the rise of capitalism, to subsume the economy as the
sphere of reproduction because of the existence of the barrier to commodification. To remove this
barrier is, however, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the advent of capitalism. As Marx
points out, in order that the market may subsume the economy, money-holders “must be so lucky
(glücklich) as to find, within the sphere of circulation, in the market, a commodity, whose use
value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption,
therefore, is itself an embodiment of labour, and, consequently, a creation of value” (Marx [1867]
1996, p. 177).
While it is well-known that the finding of so-called free labourers in the double sense––as the
outcome of the primitive accumulation of capital––is a condition for industrial capital, it has
received little attention that Marx expressed this finding as lucky (glücklich). In what sense does
he use the word lucky here? In order to answer this question—even though it may seem a round-
about approach—we shall refer to Louis Althusser’s latest thinking. 
Althusser, who, early on, had advanced the theory of overdetermination in opposition to
Hegelian dialectical materialism, later reached a more drastic theory of history, namely aleatory
materialism.
It is often said that dialectical materialism demonstrates the necessity of history through its
discovery of the base and superstructure. While the young Althusser criticised determinism in the
narrow sense of the base absolutely determining the superstructure, he allowed for determination
in the “last instance” by production. Soon thereafter, however, he threw away this last remnant of
determinism.
From this late perspective, the transitions in modes of production, including not only the
transition from capitalism to communism but also the transition from feudalism to capitalism, are
completely contingent, not necessary. It is not satisfactory that one rejects the internal
development of either the market or the economy and allows the “relative autonomy” of multiple
processes. In other words, one will fall into determinism in a broad sense if one understands that
the dismantling of the community inevitably leads to the subsumption of the economy by the
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17 Polanyi, who understood that the propensity to exchange is unnatural for society, in opposition to Smith, expected
the self-protection of society, corresponding to what we call the barrier to commodification, in capitalism. We can say that
he neglected the problem of the irreversibility of history in a diametrically opposite sense.
18 For instance, recall the ongoing process of commodifying human bodies: blood, internal organs, sperm, eggs,
genomic data, and so forth.
market, namely, the rise of capitalism, no matter in what way one recognises that the dismantling
is not an act of the market.
How can we avoid determinism in every sense? Althusser finds a clue in Marx, who allegedly
originated dialectical materialism:
In untold passages, Marx––this is certainly no accident––explains that the capitalist
mode of production arose from the ‘encounter’ between ‘the owners of money’ and the
proletarian stripped of everything but his labour-power. ‘It so happens’ that this
encounter took place, and ‘took hold’, which means that it did not come undone as soon
as it came about, but lasted, and became an accomplished fact, the accomplished fact of
this encounter, inducing stable relationships and a necessity the study of which yields
‘laws’––tendential laws, of course: the laws of development of the capitalist mode of
production (the law of value, the law of exchange, the law of cyclical crises, the law of
the crisis and decay of the capitalist mode of production, the law of the
passage––transition––to the socialist mode of production under the laws of the class
struggle, and so on). What matters about this conception is less the elaboration of laws,
hence of an essence, than the aleatory character of the ‘taking-hold’ of this encounter,
which gives rise to an accomplished fact whose laws it is possible to state. (Althusser
[1982] 2006, p. 197)
Althusser, in his interpretation of Marx, says that capitalism arose from the “encounter” between
money-holders and free labourers.  Strictly speaking, Marx himself did not use the word encounter
(Begegnung) but the word finding (Fund) in this context. This, however, is not a great mistake
because Althusser implies an aleatory character when he uses this word, for Marx expresses the
finding of free labourers as lucky for money-holders.
Althusser expresses the encounter as aleatory in a double sense. First, the encounter itself is
contingent: “the encounter might not have taken place,”19 and second, the maintenance of the
encounter is accidental: “the aleatory character of the ‘taking-hold’ of this encounter.” In sum, if
the feudal rules for reproduction lost their effect and the barrier to commodification was removed,
merchants’ capital might not have encountered free labourers, and furthermore, there is a
possibility that the encounter between them would not have lasted. 
One often makes an error in ignoring these two contingencies. Let us take one example. In the
so-called transition debate, mainly between Maurice Dobb and Paul Sweezy, there was discussion
of the problem of how to understand the intervening period between the disintegration of
feudalism in the 14th century and the rise of capitalism in the 16th century. While Sweezy
maintained that this period is neither feudalist nor capitalist but transitional, Dobb rejected this
understanding of it as transitional and insisted that it constitutes the ongoing process of
disintegrating Feudalism. What Dobb said when he criticised Sweezy is of much psychoanalytical
interest. “In the final picture, therefore, these two centuries are apparently left suspended
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19 As the English translator points out (Althusser [1982] 2006, p. 207n.), this sentence is cited––Althusser did not
write––from Gilles Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. They are worth quoting in full for an illustration of the
aleatory in the first sense: “At the heart of Capital, Marx points to the encounter of two ‘principal’ elements: on one side,
the deterritorialized worker who has become free and naked, having to sell his labor capacity; and on the other, decoded
money that has become capital and is capable of buying it. The fact that these two elements result from the segmentation of
the despotic State in feudalism, and from the decomposition of the feudal system itself and that of its State, still does not
give us the extrinsic conjunction of these two flows: flows of producers and flows of money. The encounter might not have
taken place, with the free workers and the money-capital existing ‘virtually’ side by side” (Deleuze and Guattari [1972]
1983, p. 225).
uncomfortably in the firmament between heaven and earth. In the process of historical
development they have to be classified as homeless hybrids” (Sweezy et al. 1954, p. 25). The
reason why the problem of contingency is often made invisible is clearly shown: because
homelessness is uncomfortable and, furthermore, unbearable.
This response of Dobb as an orthodox materialist can be readily understood if we remember
that Althusser’s aleatory materialism is a philosophy of the emptiness-void (vide). Since one
allows for the transitional period to be empty leads to the denial of the necessity of history, history
must be saturated for Marxist orthodoxy. This can be applied not only to history but also to space.
What is outside between communities cannot be empty; it must be filled by something, namely
the market. If one thinks in this way, the problem of contingency will be completely erased.
As Althusser indicates, the void (vide) is “essential to any aleatory encounter” (Althusser
[1982] 2006, p. 202) in the place of betweenness-encounter.20 The fact that outside is empty is true
not only in pre-capitalism but also in capitalism. Since what is outside capitalism is void, and thus
infinite, there is no doubt but that the thesis of “there is no more outside” is wrong, and the thesis
of “another world is possible” is right.21
4. Excess in Capitalism
He works in order to eat, and he eats in order to work. We don’t see
the sovereign moment arrive, when nothing counts but the moment
itself. What is sovereign in fact is to enjoy the present time without
having anything else in view but this present time. (Bataille [1976]
1991b, p. 199)
When Georges Bataille once advocated the replacement of the restricted economy by the general
economy, he stressed the importance of excess (excès).22 In marked contrast to conventional
economics which is restricted to the production of wealth, Bataille focused on the squandering of
wealth, or the accursed share. While unproductively consumed in non-capitalist societies, e. g. the
sacrifice in Aztec Civilization, the potlatch in native North America, or the construction of
Versailles during France’s Absolute Monarchy, excess is productively accumulated in capitalism.
Bataille’s insight into excess has not lost its brilliance, but his understanding of the essence of
the market is unsatisfactory. He saw commodities, which are exchanged via the market, in terms of
utility, or the satisfaction of needs, for he failed to distinguish between products in general and
their form as commodities. Bataille overlooked the fact that the market is originally the domain of
excess, or that of sovereignty beyond utility, and thus lost sight of excess in capitalism. Although
Bataille viewed the worker producing the machine bolt or Donzère-Mondragon completely in
terms of utility, are they merely useful? Can the great skills of a worker and such an enormous
structure––and one, moreover, of “yellow, glittering, precious gold” (Marx [1867] 1996, p.
142)23––be reduced to utility? In conclusion, we shall simply refer to the problem of excess in
capitalism in order to find the key to these questions. 
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20 The kanji for “aida” referring to “between” in Japanese can be also pronounced “awai,” which is a nominalization
of the verb “au” meaning “encounter.” The word Betweenness-encounter is borrowed from a Japanese philosopher, Sakabe
Megumi, in an attempt to express this implication of “awai.”
21 Of course, this suggests Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire.
22 See Bataille ([1949] 1991a, [1976] 1991b).
23 This is Marx’s quotation from Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens.
As we have seen, capital expands from the domain of excess to that of necessity when the
market penetrates the economy. On such an occasion two effects occur: the inversion of the
internal and external positions, and the necessitating of excess. Here we do not deal with the
former, and focus on the latter.24
Although excess in the original sense means what exceeds necessity or the means of
subsistence, capital which used to be excess becomes necessary in the sense that it is essential to
production, or the means of production, in capitalism. Excess, namely surplus product, is gained
by subtracting not only the product necessary for the means of subsistence but also the product
necessary for the replacement of the old means of production by the new means of production. In
addition, even surplus product cannot be wasted in capitalism, for capitalists must convert as large
a portion of surplus product into capital as possible, or accumulate it, under the pressure of
competition. This is why excess has been replaced by scarcity in modern economics.
In fact, however, capitalism is haunted by excess, that is, materiality, at three levels: money,
labour-power, and capital itself. It can be said that the story of capitalism is one of being haunted
by excess and exorcised by capital. Since an explanation of these three levels in detail is beyond
the scope of this introductory paper, we shall show a list of the characteristics of this three-level
excess instead.25 (Table 1.)
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